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Abstract 21 
Human voluntary actions are accompanied by a distinctive subjective experience termed “sense of 22 
agency”. We performed three experiments using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to 23 
modulate brain circuits involved in control of action, while measuring stimulation-induced changes in 24 
one implicit measure of sense of agency, namely the perceived temporal relationship between a 25 
voluntary action and tone triggered by the action. Participants perceived such tones as shifted towards 26 
the action that caused them, relative to baseline conditions with tones but no actions. Actions that 27 
caused tones were perceived as shifted towards the tone, relative to baseline actions without tones.  28 
This ‘intentional binding’ was diminished by anodal stimulation of the left parietal cortex (targeting 29 
the angular gyrus (AG)), and, to a lesser extent, by stimulation targeting the left dorsolateral 30 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), (Experiment 1). Cathodal AG stimulation had no effect (Experiment 2). 31 
Experiment 3 replicated the effect of left anodal AG stimulation for actions made with either the left 32 
or the right hand, and showed no effect of right anodal AG stimulation. The angular gyrus has been 33 
identified as a key area for explicit agency judgements in previous neuroimaging and lesion studies. 34 
Our study provides new causal evidence that the left angular gyrus plays a key role in the perceptual 35 
experience of agency. 36 
Keywords: sense of agency; angular gyrus; dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; intentional binding; tDCS  37 
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1. Introduction 45 
Healthy human adults have the feeling that they are able to control their own actions, and, through 46 
them, external events. This is referred to as the sense of agency. Sense of agency is central to 47 
individual goal-directed action, and also to social responsibility and punishment (Frith, 2014; Moretto, 48 
Walsh, & Haggard, 2011). Moreover, many neurological and psychiatric disorders involve 49 
abnormalities of agency (de Jong, 2011; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Kranick & Hallett, 2013). 50 
Despite extensive theoretical work on agency, its neural correlates are not fully understood. 51 
Neuroimaging studies found activation of AG (Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 52 
2008) and DLPFC (Fink et al., 1999) associated with agency tasks, but the activation of these areas 53 
was always greater in the conflicting, non-agency condition than in the agency condition. In a recent 54 
meta-analysis of sense of agency, the single most consistent result was activation of a broadly-defined 55 
temporoparietal junction area conditions associated with reduced or absent sense of agency (Sperduti, 56 
Delaveau, Fossati, & Nadel, 2011).  This broad ‘non-agency’ area includes AG. Computational 57 
models of predictive motor control offer an important theoretical framework for understanding 58 
agency. An internal forward model uses efference copies of the motor command to predict outcomes 59 
(Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000). According to these models, sense of agency arises when there is a 60 
match between the predicted and actual sensory outcome of the generated action. Conversely, if 61 
current sensory information does not match the model’s prediction, then the corresponding sensory 62 
event cannot be self-generated, and no sense of agency is experienced (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 63 
2000). 64 
Farrer et al., (2008) used this framework to interpret fMRI activations of AG in particular, suggesting 65 
that AG processes discrepancies between intended action and its actual consequences. Her data 66 
showed increased activations of AG when a detectable temporal discrepancy was inserted between an 67 
action and visual feedback of the outcome, and also when participants explicitly rejected agency over 68 
the viewed outcome. 69 
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Most of these studies used explicit agency attribution tasks, in which participants judge whether they 70 
did or did not cause a specific sensory event. Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, (2008) noted that one 71 
feels a sense of agency when acting, even without making any explicit judgements. One suitable 72 
measure of this pre-reflective, sensorimotor feeling of agency is the perceived temporal relationship 73 
between a voluntary action and its sensory outcome (Moore & Obhi, 2012). The perceived time of 74 
voluntary actions and their sensory consequences are attracted towards each other. This ‘intentional 75 
binding’ is absent, or less prominent, for involuntary movements, and for associations between 76 
external events not involving voluntary actions (Cravo, Claessens, & Baldo, 2009). 77 
The neural bases of such feelings of agency are poorly understood. One neuroimaging study found a 78 
neural correlate of intentional binding in the medial frontal cortex (Kühn, Brass, & Haggard, 2013). A 79 
‘virtual lesion’ study showed that theta-burst stimulation over a slightly more anterior medial frontal 80 
location reduced the intentional binding effect (Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell, & Haggard, 2010). 81 
On the other hand, other lesion (Sirigu et al., 2004) and stimulation (Desmurget et al., 2009) studies 82 
suggested an important role of parietal cortex in intentional action and agency, though these studies 83 
did not use binding. To our knowledge, no previous causal study has investigated the influence of 84 
both frontal and parietal areas on sense of agency using implicit measures. We therefore performed 85 
three transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) experiments, to modulate excitability of key brain 86 
circuits underlying the control of action, while measuring the effects on sense of agency, using 87 
intentional binding. Our experiments investigated the respective contributions of parietal and frontal 88 
areas to intentional binding as a proxy measure of agency (Experiment 1), their susceptibility to both 89 
up- and down-regulation (Experiment 2), and their hemispheric specialisation (Experiment 3). 90 
Based on the existing neuroimaging data investigating explicit agency judgement (Farrer et al., 2003; 91 
Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2008), we predicted that anodal stimulation of putative AG should 92 
also influence the sense of agency, as measured by intentional binding. Importantly, such a result 93 
would identify a causal role for AG in sense of agency, but would not conclusively identify how AG 94 
computes agency. We also investigated the role of prefrontal areas in sense of agency. Studies of 95 
frontal contributions to sense of agency are more equivocal. Neurostimulation (Moore et al., 2010) 96 
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and neuroimaging (Kühn et al., 2013) studies of intentional binding found evidence for medial 97 
prefrontal involvement, but studies of explicit agency judgements in tasks requiring a choice between 98 
alternative actions (Chambon, Wenke, Fleming, Prinz, & Haggard, 2013) identified a more lateral 99 
prefrontal focus. DLPFC has also been identified as a key area for initiation (Jahanshahi et al., 1995) 100 
and monitoring of voluntary action (Rowe, Hughes, & Nimmo-Smith, 2010). Given the relative 101 
inaccessibility of medial prefrontal cortex to neurostimulation, we focussed here on the lateral 102 
prefrontal cortex. The stimulations targeted primarily the left hemisphere, and participants made 103 
actions with their right hand (experiments 1,2), or with either hand (experiment 3). 104 
2. Materials and Methods  105 
2.1. Participants 106 
In total 55 healthy volunteers, 18-35 years of age (25 females) were recruited from the Institute of 107 
Cognitive Neuroscience subject data pool for three separate experiments. All participants were right 108 
handed, had normal or corrected to normal vision, had no history or family history of seizure, epilepsy 109 
or any neurologic or psychiatric disorder and did not have any metallic or electronic object in the 110 
head. Participants affirmed that they had not participated in any other brain stimulation experiment in 111 
the last 48 hours, nor had consumed alcohol in the last 24 hours. The sample for Experiment 1 112 
consisted of 18 participants (8 females), Experiment 2 consisted of 19 participants (10 females) and 113 
Experiment 3 consisted of 18 participants (7 females). One participant failed to finish Experiment 2 114 
due to lack of concentration, and was therefore excluded. Experimental design and procedure were 115 
approved by the UCL research ethics committee, and followed the principles of the Declaration of 116 
Helsinki. Transcranial stimulation followed established safety procedures (Nitsche et al., 2003; 117 
Poreisz, Boros, Antal, & Paulus, 2007). Participants were paid a minimum amount for participating in 118 
each session of the experiment. Participants were paid a small additional bonus at the end of the last 119 
session. 120 
2.2. Behavioural task 121 
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We used intentional binding paradigm as an implicit measure of agency (Fig. 1). The task was based 122 
on previous studies (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002), and was programmed in LabVIEW 2012 123 
(Austin, Texas). Participants viewed a clock hand rotating on a computer screen which was located 124 
60cm in front of the participants in a quiet room. The initial clock position was random. Clock 125 
rotation was initiated by participants pressing the return key on a keyboard. Each full rotation lasted 126 
2560ms. Participants were instructed to look at the centre of the clock. They made voluntary actions, 127 
when instructed, by pressing the return key with their right index finger (Experiments 1, 2), or by 128 
pressing F9 or F4 with their right or left index finger, respectively (Experiment 3). Participants chose 129 
for themselves when to make these voluntary actions. After each key press, the clock hand stopped at 130 
a random location, participants made a time judgement according to condition (see later). Each 131 
experimental session consisted of four types of trials, presented in separate blocked and randomised 132 
conditions. At the beginning of each block, brief instructions for the relevant condition were displayed 133 
on the screen. In the baseline action condition, participants had to press the key at a time of their own 134 
free choice. The clock hand stopped after 1500-2500ms (at random), and participants then judged the 135 
clock hand position at the time of their key press, entering their response on the keyboard. In this 136 
condition, the participant’s actions produced no sensory outcome. In the baseline tone condition, 137 
participants were instructed to look at the clock but not to press any key. While the clock was rotating, 138 
a pure tone (1000Hz, 100ms duration) was played over a loudspeaker, 1750-4000ms (at random) after 139 
the onset of the trial. Participants were then asked to judge the clock hand position at the time of the 140 
tone. In the operant action condition, participants pressed a key at a time of their own choosing, and 141 
each keypress produced a tone after 250ms. Participants judged the clock hand position at the moment 142 
of pressing the key. Finally, the operant tone condition was similar to the operant action condition, 143 
with the difference that participants had to judge the clock hand position at the time of the tone. Each 144 
condition was tested in a separate block of 30 trials. The order of the blocks was randomised and there 145 
was a 1 minute break between each block. 146 
This common basic design was slightly changed according to the demands of each specific 147 
experiment. In Experiment 3, text below and above the clock instructed participants to reply with 148 
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either their left or right index fingers. The order of hands was randomised in each block. The block 149 
length was increased by 40 trials to allow sufficient trials for analysis of each hand’s data. 150 
Before each experiment, participants were trained and familiarised with the task. They were reminded 151 
to look at the centre of the clock, to avoid following the clock hand with their eyes, to be spontaneous 152 
in their key presses and to be as precise as possible in their judgements, in particular not confining 153 
themselves to those numbers 5,10,15… marked on the clock face. Each experimental session 154 
consisted of four blocks and took approximately 20 minutes. The short duration of each individual 155 
session was planned to coincide with the known effective period of tDCS. 156 
2.3. tDCS 157 
Direct current stimulation was delivered by StarStim noninvasive wireless neurostimulator 158 
(Neuroelectrics, Barcelona, Spain). Circular rubber electrodes (25cm2) were covered in saline-soaked 159 
sponges, installed in a 27 channel neoprene cap, and connected to a wireless current generator. tDCS 160 
was then controlled by Neuroelectrics Instrument Controller (NIC v1.2) through a separate computer. 161 
Current strength was set at 1mA in all experiments, generating a current density of 0.04mA/cm2 at the 162 
scalp surface. For each experiment, all participants underwent three separate sessions of tDCS, two 163 
effective stimulations and one sham session. The order of the sessions was randomised and 164 
counterbalanced across participants. There was a minimum of 48 hours (and a maximum of 1 week) 165 
between each stimulation session to minimise any potential carry over effects of tDCS (Nitsche et al., 166 
2008). The duration of stimulation in each session was set at 25 minutes, including 30s to ramp-up 167 
and down the stimulating current. For the sham condition, electrical current was only applied during 168 
the first and last 30 seconds of the stimulation, so as to induce the same cutaneous sensation as real 169 
stimulation, and thus blind the participants as to stimulation condition. During the first 5min of each 170 
stimulation, participants were asked to relax on their seats and close their eyes. This delay was 171 
designed to allow potential neuro-modulatory effects to build up (Zwissler et al., 2014). Next, 172 
participants began the behavioural task while stimulation continued (Fig. 2). All participants finished 173 
the behavioural task approximately after 20min, the same time as the end of stimulation. In case 174 
participants finished the task prior to the end of stimulation they were asked to remain seated until the 175 
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end of the stimulation. In case the task outlasted the stimulation, they continued to perform the task 176 
without further stimulation. The task period never exceeded the stimulation period by more than 2 177 
minutes. 178 
Fig. 2 shows tDCS montages of the three experiments. In Experiment 1, the anodal electrode was 179 
placed on the left DLPFC (F3 according to the 10/20 international EEG electrode placement) or 180 
putative left AG (position P3) (Okamoto et al., 2004; Spitoni et al., 2013) in separate sessions. During 181 
the sham session, the position of the stimulating electrode was counterbalanced between F3 and P3. In 182 
all three sessions, the return electrode (cathodal) was placed on the right supraorbital area. For 183 
Experiment 2, anode and cathode were placed on the putative left AG in separate sessions while the 184 
return electrode was placed on the right supraorbital area. This arrangement was retained during the 185 
sham session. Experiment 3 used a biparietal montage (Cohen Kadosh, Soskic, Iuculano, Kanai, & 186 
Walsh, 2010; Hecht, Walsh, & Lavidor, 2010). For anodal stimulation of the putative left AG, the 187 
anode was placed over P3 and cathode was placed over P4. This arrangement was reversed for anodal 188 
stimulation of the putative right AG. For sham stimulation, the anode was pseudorandomly placed 189 
either at P3 or P4. After each session participants were asked as part of debriefing if they had 190 
experienced any notable effects of stimulation. No effects were reported other than mild tingling 191 
sensations localised to the electrodes.   192 
2.4. Data analysis 193 
The difference between the judged clock hand position and the actual onset of the corresponding 194 
event was calculated, giving a judgement error for each trial. A perceptual delay was represented by a 195 
positive judgement error, and an anticipation by a negative judgement error. The mean and standard 196 
deviation of the judgement errors across trials were then measured for each condition. Action binding 197 
was defined as the shift of action toward its outcome, and was calculated by subtracting each 198 
participant’s mean judgement error in the baseline action from that in the operant action condition. 199 
Likewise, tone binding was defined as a shift in the perceived time of a tone towards the action that 200 
caused it. Tone binding was calculated by subtracting each participant’s mean judgement error in 201 
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baseline tone condition from that in the operant tone condition. Thus, perceptual association of an 202 
action with a subsequent tone produced a positive value for action binding, and a negative value for 203 
tone binding. We analysed action and tone binding separately, since there is evidence from both 204 
cognitive studies (Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner, & Rowe, 2013), and previous neurostimulation studies 205 
(Moore et al., 2010), that they are driven by distinct mechanisms.  206 
Some participants were excluded because of highly variable time judgement. A standard deviation of 207 
judgement error across trials of over 250ms in any condition was used as a marker of poor time 208 
perception. As in previous intentional binding experiments (Haggard, Aschersleben, Gehrke, & Prinz, 209 
2002), these participants were excluded. On this basis, two participants were excluded from 210 
Experiment 1, two from Experiment 2, and four from Experiment 3. Importantly, these exclusion 211 
criteria are orthogonal to the mean judgement errors used for statistical inference.  212 
In Experiments 1 and 2, inferential statistics were based on one-way repeated measures ANOVA, 213 
with paired-sample t-tests for follow-up testing. Because our ANOVA had only 3 levels, Bonferroni 214 
correction was not required for follow-up testing after a significant result (Cardinal & Aitken, 2013; 215 
Meier, 2006). Additionally, in Experiment 1, we used linear discriminant analysis to determine which 216 
percepts were most strongly affected by stimulation condition. Experiment 3 used repeated measures 217 
ANOVA, with the additional factor of acting hand (right hand responses vs. left hand responses). A 218 
final pooled analysis was performed to compare effects of stimulation common to all conditions.  219 
3. Results 220 
3.1. Experiment 1: frontal vs parietal anodal stimulation 221 
This experiment compared the effects of frontal (targeting left DLPFC) and parietal (targeting left 222 
AG) cortex stimulation on intentional binding for actions and tones. One-way repeated measures-223 
ANOVA with the factor of stimulation type (anodal frontal vs. anodal parietal vs. sham) showed that 224 
action binding was not significantly affected by the type of stimulation (F(2, 30)=1.90, p=0.17, 225 
η2=0.11). However, an identical ANOVA on tone binding showed significant differences (F(2, 226 
30)=4.30, p=0.02, η2=0.22). Follow-up testing showed that tone binding was significantly reduced by 227 
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anodal stimulation of the putative left AG compared to sham (t(15)=2.67, p=0.02, d=0.43). Anodal 228 
stimulation of the left DLPFC showed a clear trend to reduce tone binding, which approached the 229 
border of conventional significance (t(15)=2.07, p=0.06, d=0.42). There was no significant difference 230 
between the frontal and parietal stimulation (t(15)=-0.10, p=0.92, d=0.02) (Fig. 3; see also 231 
supplementary table A.1-6). 232 
We additionally performed the same analysis using median rather than mean judgement error in each 233 
condition (see supplementary table B.1-3), since median measures are more robust than means to the 234 
influence of outliers. The patterns of statistical significance were unchanged. 235 
Finally, to confirm that anodal stimulation of putative AG affected primarily the operant tone 236 
condition and not the baseline tone, the effect of stimulation type on participants’ judgement error in 237 
baseline tone conditions was assessed using repeated-measure one-way ANOVA. There was no 238 
significant main effect of stimulation type on baseline tone condition (F(2, 30)=0.58, p=0.56, 239 
η2=0.04). This suggests that stimulation influenced a neurocognitive process that is present primarily 240 
in the operant condition. 241 
We additionally applied multivariate linear discriminant analysis (Krzanowski, 2000) to identify the 242 
linear combination of action binding and tone binding variables that optimally discriminates the 243 
different stimulation conditions. Linear discriminant analysis significantly differentiated the three 244 
stimulation conditions (Wilks' Lambda=0.59, approx. F(4,58)=4.36, p<0.01). Inspection of canonical 245 
coefficients showed that this difference was primarily due to tone binding (standardized canonical 246 
coefficient 1.86) rather than action binding (-0.93) (The scores of the individual participants on the 247 
first discriminant variate are shown in supplementary Fig. A.1). Post-hoc comparisons between 248 
conditions showed a highly significant difference between parietal and sham stimulation (p<0.01; 249 
standardised coefficients -1.03 for action binding, 2.19 for tone binding), and also a significant 250 
difference between frontal and sham stimulation (p=0.04; standardised coefficients -0.82 for action 251 
binding, 1.55 for tone binding). Interestingly, the frontal effect thus involved a slightly larger action 252 
binding coefficient, considered relative to the tone binding coefficient, than did the parietal effect, 253 
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though no inferential statistics can be applied to this ratio. Frontal and parietal stimulation did not 254 
differ significantly (p=0.74). 255 
3.2. Experiment 2: anodal vs cathodal parietal stimulation 256 
If anodal stimulation boosts activity in the left AG then cathodal stimulation of the same area should 257 
lead to its suppression. Thus, if anodal stimulation decreases intentional binding, cathodal stimulation 258 
should increase it. To test this hypothesis, putative left AG was exposed to anodal, cathodal or sham 259 
stimulation in different sessions, and effects on intentional binding were evaluated. 260 
One-way repeated measures-ANOVA with the factor of stimulation type (anodal parietal vs. cathodal 261 
parietal vs. sham) was used for analysis. Action binding was not significantly affected by the type of 262 
stimulation (F(2, 30)=0.50, p=0.61, η2=0.03). Tone binding was also unaffected by type of stimulation 263 
(F(2, 30)=0.45, p=0.64, η2=0.03), contrary to our predictions from Experiment 1. Nevertheless, the 264 
numerical effect of anodal stimulation of the putative left AG was in the same direction as Experiment 265 
1, namely a decreased tone binding compared to sham and cathodal stimulation (Fig. 4; see also 266 
supplementary table A.7-12).  267 
We additionally performed the same analysis using median rather than mean judgement error in each 268 
condition (see supplementary table B.4-6). The patterns of statistical significance were unchanged. 269 
3.3. Experiment 3: left vs right parietal stimulation 270 
Experiment 3 aimed to replicate the effects of Experiment 1, and additionally investigated the 271 
lateralisation of intentional binding using a biparietal montage. The biparietal montage may provide a 272 
higher local current density, because of the relatively short path between anode and cathode. In 273 
addition, this montage controls for any possible effect of cathodal stimulation of prefrontal areas that 274 
may occur with the conventional supraorbital placement of the cathode. Therefore, putative left and 275 
right AG were exposed to anodal stimulation in separate sessions, and a third session involved sham 276 
stimulation. We also investigated whether the putative AG involvement in intentional binding is hand-277 
specific or hemisphere-specific, by asking participants to make actions with either the left or right 278 
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hand, choosing randomly on each trial. Analysis of action binding showed no significant main effect 279 
of stimulation type (F(2, 26)=0.06, p=0.94, η2=0.01) or acting hand F(1, 13)=0.10, p=0.76, η2=0.01) 280 
and no significant interaction (F(2, 26)=0.89, p=0.42, η2=0.06). Analysis of tone binding showed a 281 
highly significant main effect of stimulation (F(2, 26)=5.93, p<0.01, η2=0.31). Follow-up testing 282 
showed that anodal stimulation of the putative left AG significantly decreased tone binding relative to 283 
both sham stimulation (t(13)=2.55, p=0.02, d=0.40), and relative to anodal stimulation of the putative 284 
right AG (t(13)=2.90, p=0.01, d=0.56). No significant difference was observed between anodal 285 
stimulation of the putative right AG and sham (t(13)=-0.75, p=0.47, d=0.10) (Fig. 5; see also 286 
supplementary table A.13-18). Acting hand had no significant main effect on tone binding (F(1, 287 
13)=0.01, p=0.94, η2<0.01) and no interaction was observed between the stimulation and acting hand 288 
(F(2, 26)=0.15, p=0.86, η2=0.01). 289 
We additionally performed the same analysis using median rather than mean judgement error in each 290 
condition (see supplementary table B.7-9). The patterns of statistical significance were unchanged. 291 
To check whether the decrease in tone binding was primarily due to shifts in the operant tone, or in 292 
the baseline tone condition, participants’ judgement errors in the baseline tone condition were 293 
compared across the stimulation groups. Analysis showed no significant main effect of stimulation 294 
type on baseline tone condition (F(2, 26)=0.50, p=0.60, η2=0.04). 295 
3.4. Pooled data: anodal parietal vs sham stimulation 296 
Anodal stimulation of the putative left AG was common to all three experiments reported here, as was 297 
a sham stimulation condition, although the experiments differed in other respects. Therefore, we 298 
pooled the data in these specific conditions across the 46 participants (21 female) from the three 299 
experiments, in a single analysis. We found that anodal stimulation of putative left AG significantly 300 
reduced the perceptual shift of tone toward action compared to sham (t(45)= 3.28, p<0.01, d=0.35), 301 
but had no effect on action binding (t(45)=-1.37, p=0.18, d=0.22). 302 
The anodal montage in the third session used a different return (cathode) location compared to the 303 
first and second experiments. Our decision to pool data of the three studies was based on the common 304 
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placement of the anode across these three experiments, and the general observation that cathodal 305 
effects on cognitive function are rare (Jacobson, Koslowsky, & Lavidor, 2012). In that case, 306 
differences in cathode location may be relatively unimportant, and need not prevent pooling across 307 
studies. However, because we cannot entirely exclude some contribution of cathodal location to our 308 
main results, we ran a further pooled analysis using the left anodal stimulation conditions of 309 
experiments 1 and 2 only, which share a supraorbital cathode location, but excluding experiment 3.  310 
This analysis again found that anodal stimulation of putative left AG significantly reduced the 311 
perceptual shift of tone toward action compared to sham (t(31)= 2.45, p=0.02, d=0.35), but had no 312 
effect on action binding (t(31)=-1.48, p=0.15, d=0.32). 313 
To investigate the generality of the anodal AG effect across experiments, we performed a mixed 314 
ANOVA with a between-subject factor of experiments (1, 2 or 3), and a repeated-measures factor of 315 
stimulation type (anodal left AG vs. sham). The main effect of stimulation type (F(1, 43)=10.7, 316 
p<0.01, η2=0.20) recapitulating the pooled t-test reported above. There was no significant main effect 317 
of experiment (F(2, 43)=0.80, p=0.45, η2=0.04). Importantly, there was no hint of interaction between 318 
experiment and stimulation (F(2,43)=0.96, p=0.39, η2=0.04). 319 
Our main inferences above are based on comparing experimental stimulation with sham. We therefore 320 
additionally investigated whether sham stimulation had different effects in the three experiments. We 321 
found no significant difference among the sham conditions for the 3 experiments for action binding 322 
(F(2,43)=2.20, p=0.12), or tone binding (F(2,43)=1.10, p=0.33).  323 
4. Discussion 324 
4.1. Stimulation-induced modulation of the left parietal cortex  325 
We performed a series of three tDCS experiments to investigate the neural circuits responsible for the 326 
sense of agency, as measured by the perceptual association between the time of a voluntary action and 327 
the time of a resulting auditory tone. We found a significant decrease in the binding of outcomes 328 
towards actions after anodal stimulation of the putative left AG (Experiment 1). Anodal stimulation of 329 
the left DLPFC also decreased action and tone binding compared to sham. DLPFC affected tone 330 
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binding as much as AG stimulation, but its effects were less consistent across participants.  331 
Nevertheless, our discriminant analysis showed a significant effect of DLPFC stimulation compared 332 
to sham, when action and tone binding were considered together. 333 
Our tDCS stimulation of putative AG could have widespread effects across the inferior parietal cortex 334 
(IPC), since tDCS has quite low spatial specificity. For example, anterior parts of the IPC may also be 335 
affected. IPC is routinely activated in neuroimaging studies when participants judge whether their 336 
own action, or some other cause, is responsible for a specific sensory event. In a study by Farrer and 337 
Frith (2002), the IPC area was more active when participants attributed a visual event to another 338 
person, rather than to themselves. Similarly, a PET study (Farrer et al., 2003) observed that neural 339 
activity in IPC increased with the level of discrepancy between the executed and the observed action 340 
on the screen. In an fMRI study (Farrer et al., 2008), the subjective feeling of loss of control 341 
correlated with BOLD response in the AG, as did the awareness of temporal discrepancy between 342 
action and feedback. The authors of those studies suggested that AG houses the comparison between 343 
the efference copy of the intended action and the actual sensory outcome. Any mismatch between 344 
these signals will then give rise to the explicit awareness of non-agency, or an external source of 345 
action.  346 
Our overall results are consistent with this view. We found that anodal stimulation of the putative AG 347 
decreases intentional binding, our proxy measure for agency. Anodal stimulation is generally thought 348 
to increase the activity of the cortical region immediately under the electrode. However, AG 349 
activation is routinely associated with lack of agency, rather than with experience of positive agency 350 
(Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2008; Sperduti et al., 2011). Therefore, excitation of a neural 351 
substrate of non-agency might be expected to decrease intentional binding. The conventional polarity-352 
specific (anode-boosting, cathode-suppressing) framework of tDCS was developed on the basis of 353 
effects in primary motor cortex stimulation (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). Its applicability to non-primary 354 
areas and cognitive processing has recently been questioned (Horvath, Forte, & Carter, 2014).  355 
Nevertheless, our findings are broadly compatible with the conventional polarity-specific view. 356 
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4.2. Stimulation-induced modulation of the left frontal cortex  357 
Since DLPFC is normally thought to facilitate intentional action, one may question why prefrontal 358 
anodal tDCS did not increase intentional binding. Rowe et al., (2010) questioned whether DLPFC 359 
played any important role in initiation of simple voluntary actions, such as those tested here, and 360 
suggested a role in monitoring sequential action patterns instead. Fink et al., (1999) observed 361 
activation of DLPFC using PET when an intentional action and its sensory outcome were 362 
incompatible. Anodal tDCS over DLPFC might correspond to an increased coding for action-outcome 363 
conflict, even though our task did not explicitly manipulate action-outcome compatibility. Our 364 
discriminant analysis found some evidence consistent with this interpretation. However, this effect 365 
was investigated in only one experiment, and achieved statistical significance in multivariate analysis, 366 
but not in univariate analyses of action binding and tone binding separately. Therefore, further 367 
research is required before a strong statement about frontal tDCS effects on sense of agency can be 368 
made. 369 
4.3. Polarity-specific effects of tDCS   370 
Experiment 2 aimed to investigate whether parietal stimulation effects were polarity-specific. On one 371 
model, tDCS would simply add neural noise, irrespective of polarity. On another model, anodal 372 
stimulation would upregulate putative non-agency coding in AG, while cathodal stimulation should 373 
down-regulate it. The result of anodal left AG stimulation in experiment 2 followed the expected 374 
trend for tone binding, but did not reach statistical significance. Replication of statistically significant 375 
results is an important and controversial issue in modern neuroscience (Cumming, 2005). All effects 376 
measured in experiments represent a combination of the underlying ‘true’ effect, and noise. 377 
Importantly, when a nonzero true effect indeed exists, but is modest in size, it is quite likely for the 378 
effect to reach statistically significant levels in one study, but not in another. Thus, absence of a 379 
significant anodal tDCS effect in experiment 2 does not prove that no true effect exists: we return to 380 
this point later. 381 
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Experiment 2 found no significant difference between cathodal and sham stimulation, although we 382 
had predicted that cathodal stimulation might enhance intentional binding. Although inhibitory 383 
cathodal effects on motor function are well established, a recent review of 34 studies found that 384 
cathodal inhibitory effects on cognitive function are rare (Jacobson, Koslowsky, et al., 2012). Another 385 
possible reason for the absence of any significant cathodal AG effect in Experiment 2 could be the 386 
placement of the anode electrode on the supraorbital area. This location is standard for tDCS studies 387 
of action (Nitsche et al., 2008). However, it causes a strong current density close to the frontopolar 388 
and prefrontal areas, where the anode is located. These areas may also contribute to intentional action 389 
(Brass & Haggard, 2007). Thus, our montage for cathodal stimulation of AG in experiment 2 involved 390 
anodal stimulation at a frontopolar site, which may not be strictly neutral for sense of agency. Future 391 
studies could address this issue by using extracephalic cathode placement. 392 
4.4. Hemispheric specialisation of the sense of agency 393 
Experiment 3 avoided the potential confound of frontopolar stimulation using a biparietal montage.  394 
This produces a higher current density in a small region surrounding the electrodes (Cohen Kadosh et 395 
al., 2010; Nathan, Sinha, Gordon, Lesser, & Thakor, 1993), compared to the conventional supra-396 
orbital location. This might result in a more focal stimulation. More importantly, the biparietal 397 
montage excludes the possibility that the significant effects of anodal AG stimulation in experiments 398 
1 and 2 were in fact caused by cathodal frontopolar stimulation. Specifically, if the effects in 399 
experiments 1 and 2 were merely due to cathodal frontopolar stimulation, then no effect of stimulation 400 
should be found in experiment 3. The biparietal montage also allowed us to investigate lateralisation 401 
of agency by varying both tDCS polarity and the hand used for action. Similar approaches have been 402 
used previously in other studies (Bardi, Kanai, Mapelli, & Walsh, 2013; Jacobson, Goren, Lavidor, & 403 
Levy, 2012). 404 
The results of the third experiment replicated our previous findings. Anodal stimulation of putative 405 
left AG significantly decreased tone binding compared to both sham and cathodal stimulation of the 406 
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same area. The tDCS effect was statistically equivalent whether the action was made with the left or 407 
the right hand. No effects were observed with anodal stimulation of the putative right AG. 408 
Experiment 3 does not support the alternative interpretation of experiments 1 and 2 based on a 409 
putative cathodal frontopolar stimulation. In contrast, experiment 3 supports the interpretation of an 410 
anodal left AG effect. We cannot conclusively rule out some contribution of frontopolar stimulation to 411 
our results, but we can rule in a specific contribution of the left AG. 412 
Experiment 3 adds several important elements to the previous studies. First, it demonstrates an 413 
involvement of AG in a task involving randomised, stimulus-driven selection between alternative 414 
actions, as opposed to mere repetition of a simple action. Second, it suggests that left, but not right 415 
AG is responsible for action-outcome binding for actions made by either hand. We found no 416 
interaction between stimulation and hand used for action. Previous neuroimaging studies have 417 
reported activation corresponding to non-agency judgements in both left and right AG. Interestingly, 418 
right AG activations appeared to dominate (Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 419 
2008), in contrast to our finding. However, in a more recent fMRI study, Lee & Reeve, (2013) 420 
reported higher activity in the left AG during non-self-determined behaviour, consistent with our 421 
hypothesis in Experiment 1 that anodal AG stimulation activates a neural code for ‘non-agency’. 422 
Finally, hemispheric specialisation of agency could plausibly depend on the task used, and the type of 423 
agency judgement. Previous neuroimaging studies generally used explicit judgements of agency, and 424 
often used complex manual actions with visual feedback (Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2008; 425 
Sperduti et al., 2011). We are not aware of any neuroimaging study investigating the hemispheric 426 
lateralisation of low-level implicit measures of agency. 427 
4.5. Limitations 428 
The results of experiment 3 by themselves could not distinguish between an effect of anodal 429 
stimulation of the putative left AG from an effect of cathodal stimulation of the putative right AG. 430 
However, this result does allow us to exclude a model in which tDCS simply acts to increase neural 431 
noise, irrespective of polarity. Moreover, our experiment 1 found some evidence of a left-hemisphere 432 
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anodal tDCS effect, while our experiment 2 found no evidence of any cathodal effect (though in the 433 
left hemisphere, rather than the right). Cathodal stimulation effects in cognitive tasks are reported to 434 
be weak (Jacobson, Koslowsky, et al., 2012). Therefore, we provisionally favour an interpretation of 435 
experiment 3 based on a left parietal anodal effect, rather than a right-hemisphere cathodal effect. 436 
Further research would be required to draw a definitive conclusion. 437 
Our study is further limited because we did not control for cases of crossmodal binding in the absence 438 
of active movement. Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that AG stimulation influenced 439 
some general feature of time perception, as opposed to temporal processing specific to agency. 440 
However, several studies have shown stronger binding between voluntary actions and outcomes than 441 
between other, similarly paired, events, including involuntary movements and outcomes (Engbert, 442 
Wohlschläger, Thomas, & Haggard, 2007; Haggard et al., 2002) or pairs of sensory stimuli (Haggard, 443 
Aschersleben, Gehrke, & Prinz, 2002; Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod, & Franck, 2003). 444 
Moreover, other studies have investigated effects of parietal tDCS on time perception in general, in 445 
the absence of action: and these studies found no effect (Woods et al., 2014). Thus, the weight of 446 
other studies suggests that the intentional binding phenomenon reflects a distortion of perceptual 447 
timing that is, at least partly, specific to voluntary action. 448 
 449 
4.6. Dissociation between action binding and tone binding 450 
Anodal stimulation over putative left AG was a common condition in all 3 experiments. Accordingly, 451 
we could perform a pooled analysis of intentional binding results to compare this to the sham 452 
stimulations that were also included in each experiment. This analysis showed a highly significant 453 
reduction in tone binding with anodal stimulation of the putative left AG. We found no overall effect 454 
on action binding. Dissociations between action binding and tone binding have been reported 455 
previously (Wolpe et al., 2013), so it is possible that left parietal cortex is concerned primarily with 456 
tone binding, rather than with action binding. This conclusion would be consistent with previous 457 
studies suggesting that the AG processes mismatches in action outcomes (Farrer et al., 2008). On the 458 
other hand, recent studies of explicit agency judgement suggest that AG also processes prospective, 459 
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premotor information arising during action selection (Chambon, Moore, & Haggard, 2014; Chambon 460 
et al., 2013). 461 
Both online prospective and retrospective processes contribute to the intentional binding phenomenon 462 
(Moore and Haggard, 2008). The experimental design used here cannot identify the independent 463 
contribution of each process. However, binding of action towards outcome may rely more on 464 
prospective processes during action selection, while perceptual shift of outcome toward action may 465 
depend on retrospective, more inferential processes, triggered by reafferent signals about action 466 
outcome (Chambon, Moore, & Haggard, 2014). Future studies may address this issue by designing 467 
new paradigms which dissociate prospective and retrospective components of agency and examine the 468 
role of dLPFC and AG in each of these components. 469 
4.7. Conclusion and clinical implications 470 
Sense of agency is an important and distinctive feature of human voluntary action. We used a causal 471 
intervention (tDCS) and an implicit perceptual measure of sense of agency (intentional binding) to 472 
examine the role of different brain areas in sense of agency. Anodal stimulation of parietal cortex 473 
consistently reduced the binding of tones towards actions. We hypothesised that the angular gyrus 474 
might contribute to the sense of agency by monitoring the linkage of actions to outcomes, or, 475 
alternatively and equivalently, failures of such linkage. Anodal stimulation of this area may 476 
correspond to artificial boosting of a mismatch detection process.  477 
Sense of agency is altered following several classes of psychiatric and neurological disorders. In 478 
particular, patients with apraxia following lesions to the left parietal fail to recognise the source of a 479 
viewed manual gesture (Sirigu, Daprati, Pradat-Diehl, Franck, & Jeannerod, 1999). This deficit is 480 
formally equivalent to an overestimation of agency in an explicit judgement task, consistent with 481 
damage to a neural centre detecting mismatches. The posterior form of ‘alien hand syndrome’ is also 482 
associated with contralateral parietal lesions (e.g., (Kloesel, Czarnecki, Muir, & Keller, 2010)).  483 
Interestingly, these patients show involuntary and spontaneous movements of the contralateral limb, 484 
but may correctly perceive that they are not agents over these actions. The capacity for voluntary 485 
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movement is often preserved. Quantitative assessment of the implicit sense of agency in parietal 486 
patients would be of considerable value in understanding the neural basis of sense of agency. 487 
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Captions 669 
Fig. 1. Schematic of intentional binding. Action and tone shifts are measured by subtracting each 670 
participant’s mean judgement error in baseline conditions from judgement error in operant conditions.  671 
These shifts serve as measures of intentional binding. Vertical bars and thin arrows represent mean 672 
judgement errors in each condition. Thick arrows represent binding effects. See text for full 673 
explanation. 674 
Fig. 2. A. tDCS montage and study design (anode +, cathode -). See text for explanation. In 675 
Experiment 1, to control for the cutaneous sensation of all three locations, all sponges were kept in 676 
place across the three sessions. However, only two of them were actually functioning in each session. 677 
B. Stimulation protocol. The order of conditions was randomised within each session. 678 
Fig. 3. Intentional binding in Experiment 1. A) The dashed line indicates the perceived time of either 679 
action or tone in the corresponding baseline condition. A separate baseline condition was used for 680 
each session, and differences in baseline values across sessions have been removed for display 681 
purposes. Binding effects are drawn to scale, and values are in milliseconds. B) Mean binding effects 682 
in ms. The sign of tone binding effects has been inverted to allow for comparison with action binding.  683 
Error bars show standard error of the mean. * p<0.05. 684 
Fig. 4. Intentional binding in Experiment 2. Format as in Fig. 3.  685 
Fig. 5. Intentional binding in Experiment 3. Format as in Fig. 3. 686 
x Effects of tDCS on implicit measures of sense of agency were measured. 
x Anodal stimulation of the left angular gyrus decreased ‘intentional binding’. 
x Cathodal stimulation had no effect. 
x The left angular gyrus plays a key role in the experience of agency. 
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